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STATE OF UTAH 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Civil No. 870308-CA 
MICHAEL CHUGG, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
000O000 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction herein conferred upon the Court of Appeals 
by Article V11I, Section 5 ot the Utah Constitution, &78-4-11 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §77-35-26(3)(a), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended (1987), Rule 3(a), Rule 4(a) and Rule 
33 (a) ot the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of a judgment by the Honorable David 
W. Sorenson of the Second Circuit Court ot the State of Utah. 
The Court having found there was not sufficient evidence 
presented, at the end of the State's case, found the defendant 
not guilty. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
That the appellant was not able to present sufficient 
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evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defenaant 
was: (a) arivmg or operating a vehicle upon the highways of the 
State of Utah; (b) was in actual, physical control as required by 
the Statutes; (c) was under the influence so as to be incapable 
ot operating a motor vehicle; (d) that the defendant did not fall 
within the exception of the Bugger case (483 P2d, 442); and , (e) 
that the confession of the defendant, to prove the corpus delicti 
was insufficient without independent evidence. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Statutes or cases. 
A. Utah Code Annotated, ^44-6-44(1) 1953 as amended 
B. Utah Code Annotated, ^76-1-501, 1953 as amended 
C. State v. Bugger, 483 P2d 442 
D. State v. Ferry, 273 P2d 173 
E. State v. Olsen, 75 Utah 583 (1930) 
F. State v. Petree 659 P2d 445 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant Michael Chugg, after having been bowling 
and having drunk several beers, left Ogden, Utah and drove north 
to the parking lot on the west side of Hyrum dam in Cache County, 
because he was sleepy, he pulled off the road, after having 
turned off his car and extinguished the lights, he tell asleep. 
After having been asleep approximately one and one-half hours to 
two hours he was awakened by a police officer who requested that 
-2-
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he get out of the car. Without being given the opportunity to 
put on his glasses or properly awaken himself/ he was given 
various tests and was then arrested tor driving under the 
influence of alcohol. After having been transported to the jail/ 
he submitted to a breath test and having been shown the results 
of the test was asked whether or not he was intoxicated. To that 
question, he replied, "Yes, in view of the test". His earlier 
conversations with the officer were to the effect that he had 
been drinking and that he had been asleep in the automobile. Two 
sheriff's deputies participated in the arrest/ both of whom 
testified that they had not seen the defendant drive nor could 
they determine that the vehicle had recently been stopped. 
Indeed/ one officer testified that he did not hear any cool down 
noises from the vehicle. 
Plaintiff began its trial without making an opening 
statement or announcing who the witnesses were to be / thus 
defendant was not in a position to object to the confession by 
the defendant that he had been drinking and driving. Subsequent 
to the time/ plaintiff relied exclusively upon the statement by 
the defendant that he had been drinking and driving and offered 
no evidence of the operation of the motor vehicle by the 
defendant save and except for the statement ot the defendant. 
After the two deputy sheriffs had testified/ the plaintiff rested 
without offering the breath test results and explained the lack 
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of said offer on the fact that the expert witness was not 
available but was attending a seminar. At no time did the 
plaintiff seek a continuance nor make any effort to offer the 
results but chose instead to rest. The defendant thereupon moved 
the Court to dismiss citing lack of evidence/ the requirement of 
the Bugger case, and because the court granted the acquittal 
based on the lack of evidence and the factual similarity to the 
Bugger case, the defendant did not raise the issue of Corpus 
Delicti based on his confession. The plaintiff having chosen to 
appeal the decision and the defendant not having had to raise any 
defense issues now raises the Corpus Delicti issue for the first 
time on appeal. Respondent further raised the issue of good 
faith ana frivolity and asks for attorney's fees under Rule 33 
(a) of the Rule of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court, having heard the evidence as presented 
to it by the plaintiff and having determined that the plaintiff 
presented no evidence of Corpus Delicti save and except the 
confession of the defendant, the plaintiff having presented no 
driving pattern or evidence of driving, having presented no 
scientific evidence of intoxication save and except the so called 
Nystagmus test and having failed to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, now asks the Appellate Court to 
substitute its judgment on the evidence for the judgment of the 
-4-
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trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
That insufficient evidence existed to sustain a 
conviction of the respondent. In the case of State v. Ferry, the 
Supreme Court ruled "that a defendant could not be convicted on 
the basis of his confession alone, that there must be 
independent, clear and convincing evidence of the Corpus 
Delicti..." ana in State v. Olsen, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah ruled "that in the absence of a showing that the 
defendant will be prejudiced thereby, to permit evidence of 
statements and admissions of the defendant implicating him with 
the crime charged before the existence of the Corpus Delicti is 
established..." It is error to admit the confession and 
admission for the purpose of proving the Corpus Delicti. 
In this case, the Corpus Delicti, necessary to be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence (State v. Ferry) was that the 
defendant/respondent (a) operated the motor vehicle, (b) while he 
was impaired as a result of alcohol. The appellant, having 
chosen to move forward under that part of the statute having to 
do with the operation of a vehicle within the state and then 
having chosen not to offer any evidence of the breath alcohol (TR 
p. 49) content showing that the respondent was "incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle" must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the facts of said case. They are further in a position 
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where in order to introduce and utilize the confession of the 
defendant, to prove the Corpus Delicti, they must have clear and 
convincing evidence, independent of his confession. In this 
case, neither officer saw the defendant operate the vehicle. In 
this case, the State determined not to offer the result of the 
intoxilizer and thus, used only the defendant's confession that 
he was intoxicated. (TR page 20) 
The appellant seeks now to use only the evidence of the 
defendant's confession or admission that he was driving and that 
he was intoxicated to prove his case but also to demonstrate that 
the Court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the 
acquittal. 
Appellant further suggests that the trial court reached it's 
decision based upon the argument of counsel for the defendant, 
apparently attempting to raise the said argument to the level of 
the offer of, and receipt of, evidence, completely ignoring the 
statutory and constitutional requirement that in a criminal case 
a defendant is presumed innocent until proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is presented to the trier of the facts, changing the status 
of the defendant from innocent to guilty. In this case, as in 
all criminal cases, when the State rests, the evidence of guilt 
is in. No evidence of innocence needs ever be presented and if 
counsel then moves the court for an acquittal or a dismissal 
based upon the lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
-6-
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arguments of counsel, with respect to the presentation of that 
motion, do not rise to the level of evidence or lack of evidence 
in any case. The fact that at the end of the presentation of the 
evidence, the Court had a nagging feeling on the one hand, (TR p. 
60) he did have a nagging question because no one told the Court 
that the defendant was incapable of safely operating the vehicle. 
Such incapability is a matter of proof and is one of the 
essential elements of the Corpus Delicti. What appellant appears 
not to understand about the statute, with respect to the 
operation of the motor vehicle, is that either you show the 
operation of the vehicle coupled with incapability of operation 
because of the influence of alcohol or you demonstrate some 
evidence that, in fact, the defendant, ana only the defendant, 
operated the vehicle immediately prior to the time that the 
officers discovered the defendant in the car. Such evidence, 
counsel cites, might be fresh tracks in the snow. Other courts 
have determined that if an accident occurs, a presumption of 
operation by the driver exists. To overcome the impact of the 
Bugger case and its operation upon the present case, the 
appellant had the burden of proof. The defendant/respondent told 
them that he had been asleep, no cool down noises were heard by 
the officers coming from the defendant/respondent's vehicle (TR 
p. 48) and no attempt was made by the appellant to overcome the 
fact that the defendant/respondent was not operating at the time 
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of the discovery by the officers of the vehicle parked off the 
highway. There was no accident and there were no fresh snow tire 
marks. (TR p. 20) Appellant chose to present no evidence 
overcoming the possibility that the appellant might have been 
asleep at the time of the discovery. Without a driving pattern, 
without evidence of operation, and without evidence of the 
presumption of intoxication, the State still has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant did not meet 
that burden and thus the Court should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Court stated in State v. Petri 659 P2d 445, "but 
this does not mean that the Court can take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
evidence, stretched to it's utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". Under no 
circumstances can the evidence presented here be stretched so as 
to sustain the burden which the State/Appellant had. 
Respectfully submitted this^cr day of October, IjW• 
C. DEMONT JUDD, J& 1 I W^ 
Attorney for / 
Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this day of October, 1987, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing first class mail ana 
postage prepaid to: Jeffrey "R" Burbank, Deputy Cache County 
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Attorney, Attorney for Appellant, 160 North Main, Suite 203, 
Logan, UT 84321. 
SECRETARY 
ADDENDUM 
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den. In that case, however, the trial court 
dismissed the robbery charge on its own 
volition. That is not the case here. 
The District Attorney's office, an arm 
of the state, and under the direct super-
vision of the Attorney General (67-5-1), 
that is appealing here,—a somewhat un-
orthodox and inconsistent circumstance,— 
made the motion to dismiss the action, 
which at that point was as much an issue 
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would 
seem that before this court orders the 
trial court to do much of anything the 
matter of that motion to dismiss and the 
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably 
good cause, should be resolved. 
In addition to the position I take on the 
aspect of this case reflected in the para-
graph immediately above, I urge that per-
haps we made a mistake in the remand 
portion of the McGuffey case and that we 
should overrule that part of it. The in-
stant case itself seems to point up the ad-
visability of so doing. To do anything 
more could lead us on safari in a civil 
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile 
juristic jungle of no return. 
O I KEY UUMBC* $Y$TEM> 
25 Utah 2d 404 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12278. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 6, 1971. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K. 
Swan, J., of being in actual physical con-
trol of his vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that 
defendant who was asleep in his automo-
bile which was completely off traveled por-
tion of highway and whose motor was not 
running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle" in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. 
Reversed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Automobiles <§=*332 
Defendant who was asleep in his auto-
mobile which was completely off traveled 
portion of highway and whose motor was 
not running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle', in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Flor-
ence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren 
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was found guilty of a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953, 
and from that conviction he has appealed 
to this court. 
During the night of July 28, 1969, the 
defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked upon the shoulder of a 
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis 
County. The automobile was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway 
and the motor was not running. An officer 
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene 
and discovered the defendant was asleep-
With some effort the officer succeeded »*| 
awakening the defendant, at which time tWj 
officer detected the smell of alcohol an" 
arrested the defendant for being in actual 
cySical control of the vehicle while under 
^e influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The complaint charges the defendant 
with the violation of the statute above re-
ferred to which provides as follows: 
It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section 
for any person who is under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be 
in actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state. 
The defendant is here challenging the 
validity of the statute on the grounds of 
vagueness. However, we need not decide 
the case upon that ground. QThat part of 
the statute which states: "be in actual phys-
ical control of any vehicle" has been be-
fore the courts of other jurisdictions which 
have statutes with similar wordings. The 
word "actual" has been defined as mean-
ing "existing in act or reality; * * * in 
action or existence at the time being; 
present; * * *." The word "physical" 
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is de-
fined as "to exercise restraining or direct-
ing influence over; to dominate; regulate; 
hence, to hold from actions; to curb." 
The term in "actual physical control" in 
its ordinary sense means "existing" or 
"present bodily restraint, directing influ-
ence, domination or regulation." £J It is 
clear that in the record before us the facts 
do not bring the case within the wording 
of the statute. The defendant at the time 
of his arrest was not controlling the ve-
hicle, nor was he exercising any dominion 
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by 
the plaintiff in support of its position in 
this matter deal with entirely different fact 
situations, such as the case where the driver 
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled 
portion of the highway; or where the mo-
tor of the vehicle was operating; or where 
the driver was attempting to steer the auto-
mobile while it was in motion; or where 
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Moat. 243, 
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.PL, 
s i A i x i v. jauuvrxaxw uian £ 4 3 
Cite as 483 P.2d 442 
he was attempting to brake the vehicle to 
arrest its motion. 
We are of the opinion that the facts in 
this case do not make out a violation of 
the statute and the defendant's conviction 
is reversed. We do not consider ft neces-
sary to discuss the other claimed errors 
raised by the defendant. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD 
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The statute formerly made it unlawful 
for a person under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any 
highway within this state.1 The amendment 
added a provision making it unlawful to 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a 
highway before the crime was made out 
and did away with the necessity of driving 
before a crime was committed. 
The reason for the change is obvious. 
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person 
in charge of an automobile from getting 
on the highway than it is to punish him 
after he gets on it. The amended statute 
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk 
person in the control of an automobile and 
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc 
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from 
injuring himself by his erratic driving. 
It does not matter whether the motor 
is running or is idle nor whether the drank 
is in the front seat or in the back seat. 
His potentiality for harm is lessened but 
not obviated by a silent motor or a back-
seat position—provided, of course, that he 
is the one in control of the car. It only 
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor 
or to engage the gears, and it requires only 
a moment of time to get under the wheel 
from the back seat. A drunk in control 
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl. 
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997 ; 47 A.L.R.2d 582. 
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933. 
4 4 4 Utah 483 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
of a motor vehicle has such a propensity 
to cause harm that the statute intended to 
make it criminal for him to be in a position 
to do so. 
Restraining the movement of a vehicle 
is controlling it as much as moving it is. 
A person finding a drunk in the back seat 
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely 
to learn who is in control of that car if 
he should attempt to move it. A drunk 
may maliciously block one's exit, and in 
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle. 
I think the defendant in this case was in 
control of his truck within the meaning of 
the statute even though he may have been 
asleep. He had the key and was the only 
one who could drive it. The fact that he 
chose to park it is no reason to say he was 
not in control thereof. 
I, therefore, think that we should con-
sider the question which he raises in his 
brief as to the validity of the statute. 
Cases wherein an attack was made on 
statutes like ours have been decided in a 
number of jurisdictions. They hold the 
statute good. 
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was 
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked 
next to some barricades in a lane of traf-
fic. An officer passed by and observed 
no one in the car. Later he returned and 
found the defendant "passed out." The 
statute made it a crime to be in actual 
physical control of a car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The de-
fendant contended that the wording of the 
statute was not meant to apply to a situa-
tion where the car was parked and that it 
was only concerned with the driving of an 
automobile and other acts and conduct of a 
positive nature. In holding that the statute 
was applicable to the conduct of the defend-
ant, the court said: 
An intoxicated person seated behind 
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is 
a threat to the safety and welfare of 
the public. The danger is less than that 
In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d 
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a statute 
making it unlawful for "any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical 
control of any motor vehicle within this 
state." There the defendant (appellant) 
claimed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional in that it was so vague and indefinite 
that a person charged thereunder would be 
deprived of due process of law. The court 
held that the statute did not violate any 
of appellant's constitutional rights. 
Under a similar statute the Montana Su-
preme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the 
statute was not void for vagueness, and in 
doing so said: 
* * * Thus one could have "actual 
physical control" while merely parking 
or standing still so long as one was 
keeping the car in restraint or in posi-
tion to regulate its movements. Prevent-
ing a car from moving is as much control 
and dominion as actually putting the car 
in motion on the highway. Could one 
exercise any more regulation over a 
thing, while bodily present, than preven-
tion of movement or curbing movement. 
As long as one were physically or bodily 
able to assert dominion, in the sense of 
movement, then he has as much control 
over an object as he would if he were 
actually driving the vehicle. 
* * * * * * 
* * * [I]t is quite evident that the 
statute in the instant case is neither 
vague nor uncertain. * * * 
The appellant here claims some federally 
protected rights in that he says he was im-
properly arrested. It is difficult for me to 
see where that has anything to do with 
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly 
arrested, he would have an action against 
the officer for false arrest, but surely our 
courts have not lost contact with reality 
to the extent that we turn a guilty man 
« <n_ ^ ^ « ^ „ e f o K U maV 
Cite as 4 
From w n a t n a s b e e n s a , c i a l ) 0 v e ' t n c r e 
• bsolutcly no merit to this claim. By 
1
 • * in control of an automobile while 
iL,der the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
FT defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor 
Fhich was in the presence of the officer, 
lv d the officer had a right and a duty to 
k'rrest him.2 
i?-The defendant was found guilty in the 
fxourt below of being in actual physical 
''control of his truck while he was under 
•'the influence of intoxicating liquor. He 
?does not dispute that he was drunk. If the 
^statute is good, we should not attempt to 
Overrule the trier of the facts and find 
Ifthat the defendant was not the one actual-
ly controlling his truck. 
'Y\ would affirm the judgment of the trial 
-court. 
25 Utah 2d 408 
Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
corporation, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12187. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1971. 
Appeal by insurer from judgment of 
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County, 
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that de-
ceased was covered by accident policy. 
:The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that 
where farmer was working about idling 
farm tractor located on his private proper-
ty and it rolled forward and crushed him, 
he was "pedestrian'* within policy covering 
injury "sustained in consequence of being 
struck by any land conveyance while a pe-
destrian." 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
P.2d 445 
1. Insurance €=>452 
Person on foot does not cease to be 
"pedestrian" within policy covering inju-
ries sustained while a pedestrian merely 
because he is not in motion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Insurance <§=3452 
Where farmer was working about 
idling farm tractor located on his private 
property and it rolled forward and crushed 
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy 
covering injury "sustained in consequence 
of being struck by any land conveyance 
while a pedestrian." 
Thomas S. Taylor, of Christensen, Tay-
lor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain, 
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from what was labeled a summa-
ry judgment for plaintiff which actually 
was a judgment on all available facts, un-
der an insurance policy covering injury 
"sustained in consequence of being struck 
by any land conveyance while a pedestri-
an." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. 
Believable evidence elicited under the 
discovery process indicates that plaintiffs 
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor 
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all 
of which occurred on his private property. 
The only question is whether the de-
ceased was a "pedestrian', under the terms 
of the policy. The trial court said he was, 
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no 
one questioning the fact that the tractor 
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing 
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply trav-
eled downhill as mentioned, and quite ob-
viously ran over the deceased. 
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur 
by assuming that coverage under the policy 
2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953. 
582 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH [April 
Truitt v. Patten, Sheriff, 75 Utah 567 
586; Lusch v. Huber Mfg. Co., 79 Neb. 45, 112 N. W. 284; 
Harvey v. Morse, 69 N. H. 475, 45 A. 239; Van Schaick v. 
Ramsey, 90 Hun, 550, 35 N. Y. S. 1006; Woods V. Nichols, 
22 R. I. 225, 47 A. 211; Woods V. Nichols, 21 R. I. 537, 45 
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Alder V. Chapman, 91 Okl. 196, 219 P. 90. 
Under the judgment rendered in this case plaintiff will 
receive the same amount of damages that he would have 
received if he had been the absolute owner of the automo-
bile. Clearly plaintiff was not damaged as much because 
he was deprived of his special property right in the auto-
mobile as he would have been if he had been the absolute 
owner thereof. Carlson, according to plaintiff's testimony, 
always had a right to the automobile when he paid the re-
mainder of the purchase price. If Carlson always had such 
a right I can see no escape from the conclusion that he also 
has a right to the proceeds derived from the sale of the 
automobile after plaintiff is paid the amount owing to him. 
If Carlson had such a right, it passed to the defendant by 
virtue of the attachment and sale, and plaintiff has no just 
ground to complain so long as he received the amount owing 
to him. An attaching creditor of the interest of a buyer 
to purchase property under a conditional sales contract can-
not well be said to be a stranger to the title because such 
attaching creditor acquires, by the attachment sale, the 
title theretofore held by the debtor. If plaintiff had, before 
commencing his action, demanded payment of the money 
owing him and declared a forfeiture of Carlson's interest 
in the automobile because of nonpayment of such money, 
an entirely different situation would have been presented. 
The cases of Meister & Sons Co. V. Harrison, 56 Cal. App. 
679, 206 P. 106; Duncan v. Stone, 45 Vt. 118, cited in the 
prevailing opinion, are readily distinguishable from the 
facts in this case. In both cases the buyer was in default. 
Here, as already indicated, plaintiff extended the time of 
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payment of the balance of the purchase price, and therefore 
he cannot rescind "until full notice and a reasonable time 
for performance is given." Plaintiff does not claim that 
any demand was made for the payment of the balance of 
the purchase price, or that Carlson's interest in the automo-
bile was ever forfeited. 
I am thus of the opinion that the judgment should be re-
versed and a new trial granted. 
STRAUP, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion. 
STATE v. OLSON. 
No. 4902. Decided April 24, 1930. (287 P. 181.) 
1. EMBEZZLEMENT—BANK—GENERAL SHORTAGE?—EVIDENCE!—ADMIS-
SIBILITY. In prosecution for embezzlement by bank cashier of par-
ticular sum, evidence of large general shortage was admissible. 
Accused had been taking funds from the bank for a period 
up to ten years, and admitted the taking, and accountants 
employed by bank who went over the account found a large 
shortage. Accused was prosecuted for a single transaction, 
but district attorney in opening statement told jury that 
there was a large shortage and the bank examiners and ex-
pert accountants were permitted to testify to such shortage; 
also testimony of accused's admission of such shortage was 
admitted into evidence. 
2. EMBEZZLEMENT—SHORTAGE IN BANK—BAD LOANS—PROOF. In 
prosecution for embezzlement, evidence held not to show shortage 
of bank's funds was due to bad loans. 
3. EMBEZZLEMENT—EMBEZZLEMENT PROSECUTION — PRESUMPTION 
LOANS BY BANK—REPRESENTED BY ASSETS. In absence of con-
tradictory evidence in prosecution of bank cashier for embezzle-
ment, court assumed that every loan of bank would be represented 
by corresponding asset. 
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4. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY. Evidence reasonably 
tending to establish facts sought to be proved is relevant and 
admissible unless forbidden by some rule of evidence. 
5. EMBEZZLEMENT—BANK FUNDS—EMBEZZLEMENT OF PART—EVI-
DENCE. In prosecution of bank cashier for embezzlement, it was 
sufficient to show that, out of gross sum of money received for 
bank by accused, he embezzled a portion. 
6. EMBEZZLEMENT—EVIDENCE—GENERAL SHORTAGE—PROVING PAR-
TICULAR TAKING. AS regards admissibility of evidence, general 
shortage in cash account of bank would tend materially to es-
tablish embezzlement of particular sum. 
7. EMBEZZLEMENT—GENERAL SHORTAGE—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY. 
General shortage over two years subsequent to alleged embezzle-
ment, where shortage had been continuing for ten years, was 
admissible as tending to prove particular embezzlement. 
8. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIONS—CORPUS DELICTI—OR-
DER OF PROOF. In prosecution for embezzlement, admission in evi-
dence of admissions made by accused concerning shortage before 
corpus delicti had been established, was not error, where corpus 
delicti was established later by other evidence. 
9. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—EXPERT TESTIMONY 
—EXAMINATION OF ACCOUNT BOOKS. Expert accountants could 
testify to results of examination of bank's books in prosecution of 
cashier for embezzlement, where records were numerous and 
voluminous. 
The books were such that they could not be satisfactorily 
or conveniently examined in court. The expert witnesses were 
accountants who employed their time exclusively in examin-
ing books and records of bank and business institutions. 
10. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—PRODUCTION OF BOOKS—FAILURE TO 
DEMAND. Accused cashier, in prosecution for embezzlement, could 
not complain bank's books, to examination of which experts testi-
fied, were not in court when he did not ask for them. 
Accused made definite request to neither court nor prose-
cuting counsel for production of bank's books. Prosecuting 
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: 
Criminal Law 16 C. J. § 1034 p. 543 n. 37; § 1211 p. 615 n. 66; 
§ 2180 p. 865 n. 91; 17 C. J. § 3674 p. 331 n. 46. 
Embezzlement 20 C. J. § 79 p. 482 n. 39; § 82 p. 486 n. 60. 
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counsel had offered to produce any books which accused 
might require in order to carry on the case. 
11. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—EXPERT—CONCLUSION—ADMISSIBIL-
ITY. In prosecution of cashier for embezzlement, question to ex-
pert whether shortage was reflected in checking account of ac-
cused held objectionable, where not followed by fact on which 
witness based conclusion. 
Counsel for state failed to develop just how witness was 
able to ascertain such facts from the books, records, and ac-
counts of the bank, so judge might determine as a matter 
of law whether there was any competent probative value to 
the conclusion of the expert witness. 
12. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—CONCLUSION—EXPERT—ADMISSIBIL-
ITY. In prosecution of cashier for embezzlement, testimony of 
expert about shortage as reflected by accused's checking account 
held objectionable as calling for conclusion; witness not stating 
how he arrived at figures. 
13. CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—CONCLUSIONS—HARMLESS ERROR, In 
proseution of bank cashier for embezzlement, conclusions, connect-
ing accused with general shortage, of expert accountant with-
out telling basis, held harmless error; connection having been es-
tablished beyond reasonable doubt by admissions of accused. 
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
County; O. W. McConkie, Judge. 
Leon L. Olson was convicted of embezzlement, and he 
appeals. 
AFFIRMED. 
George P. Parker, Attorney General, and L. A. Miner, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the State. 
F. W. James and J. Louis Brown, both of Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
EPHRAIM HANSON, J. 
Defendant was convicted of embezzlement. The informa-
tion charged that he was the agent and employee of the 
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Midvale State Bank and as such fraudulently appropriatei 
to his own use the sum of $1,000 on January 2, 1926, whicl 
came into his possession and under his control by virtu 
of his employment. From the conviction and the judgmen 
imposed upon him, he has appealed to this court. 
A brief statement of the facts will aid in understanding 
the questions presented by the assignment of errors. 
The accused was cashier of the bank. He had held sue? 
position from the organization of the bank, approximate!) 
eighteen years. A. L. Anderson was assistant cashier, and 
had been such for a great many years. The record does 
not disclose what other, if any, employees were regularly 
engaged in the bank. The defendant as cashier, had com-
plete charge of the bank and its funds. The other employees 
were under his direction and supervision. There was an 
auditing committee, consisting of three of the directors, 
and this committee examined the books once each three 
months. On March 25, 1928, while this committee was in 
course of making one of its regular examinations of the 
books, the defendant told E. L. Burgon, a member of the 
committee, that, when the committee came to the checking 
accounts, it would find a $25,000 shortage. This was the 
first knowledge or initmation Mr. Burgon had of a short-
tage in the bank, although he had been a director for eigh-
teen years and a member of the auditing committee for 
more than five years. It seems clear that it was the first 
knowledge that had come to any of the directors of the 
bank that there was any shortage. This examination was 
made Sunday, March 25, 1928. The examination made at 
this time did not disclose any material shortage in the sav-
ings accounts, but, owing to the disclosure of the shortage 
in the checking accounts made by the defendant and as 
verified by the examination of the auditing committee, a 
special meeting was held Monday morning at the bank at 
which W. S. Chipman, president of the bank, John A. Aylett 
and Joseph M. Holt, two of the directors, Walter H. Had-
lock and Herbert Taylor, two bank examiners from the 
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office of the state bank examiner, and defendant were 
present. Before the others had arrived at the bank, Mr. 
Holt asked defendant what the meeting was for. Defendant 
replied that there was "something wrong" in the bank. For 
a statement of what occurred, and as to what was said at 
the time and place, we here quote from the testimony of W. 
S. Chipman given at the trial and as preserved in the bill 
of exceptions : 
"I asked Mr. Olson what was wrong:, and he told me that they had 
i shortage of $25,000.00 in their individual accounts; and I asked 
lim how long it had been going on and he said upward of ten years. 
* * * I asked him how he had been able to get by the bank examiners 
.11 this while and he told me it was through the manipulation of loose 
saves; that when the bank examiners would come he would remove 
nough sheets to aggregate the $25,000.00. * * * I asked him who 
ssisted him in working these books and covering up the shortage. 
fe told me he was alone, he had no assistants, he had done it him-
»lf. * * * I asked Mr. Olson how the savings accounts were and he 
•Id me they were all right, and I called in the assistant, Mr. Anderson. 
* * I called Mr. Anderson in and asked him if he did not assist 
r. Olson in the manipulation of these accounts to deceive the bank 
aminers and he said he did. I asked him if there was any other 
ortage in the bank and he said that there was a shortage in the 
vings accounts, more than there was in the individual accounts, and 
estimated the shortage to be upwards of $40,000.00 * * * I asked 
:. Anderson how they manipulated these accounts and he told me 
;se individual accounts, they removed the leaves when there was 
examination. * * * Mr. Olson stated that he did not think the 
>rtage should be over $33,000.00. Mr. Anderson put it a great deal 
her than that all the time." 
)n cross-examination, Mr. Chipman said that he thought 
. Anderson stated to him that the shortage started when 
bank made a "poor loan" to the Childers Leasing Com-
in examination of the books and records was then made 
the bank examiners, Hadlock and Taylor, in which all 
>ent, including the defendant, assisted. With reference 
he savings accounts, they took each individual annw~* 
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as shown in the ledger of those accounts and made a list on 
an adding machine and checked it against the amounts 
apportioned to the savings account by the general ledger 
or control account. The same method was followed with 
reference to the checking accounts and also the notes. It 
was thus found that the savings account as shown by the 
individual ledger were $29,964.01 in excess of the control 
account; that the total of the "checking accounts exceeded 
the amounts apportioned to such accounts by the control 
account by over $25,000; that in the notes there were 
$8,242.50 less than was shown by the loans and discount 
account. With these figures before them, Mr. Taylor asked 
the defendant <fif there was any further shortage in any 
way." The defendant then stated that "an examination of 
some of the pass books would reveal a further difference of 
upwards of $10,000 additional shortage," and made special 
reference to Mrs. D. A. Drown's account. Mr. Burgon, who 
had not been present during the morning, came to the bank 
shortly after the noon hour and had a conference with the 
defendant and Mr. Anderson. Mr. Burgon asked defendant 
why he had not told him about the shortage in the savings 
accounts on Sunday, and either defendant or Anderson 
(witness did not remember which, but said one or the other) 
answered and said, "We didn't want to break the news all 
at one time; we wanted the officials of the bank to get a 
part of the information/' and "thought it would be easier 
that way." 
Defendant was removed from duty at the bank, and on 
the second day following, namely, March 28th, Mr. Hadlock 
and Mr. Taylor closed the bank for business. The record 
does not disclose how long the bank was closed, but Mr. 
Taylor was in control for two months and until the direc-
tors and stockholders had paid dollar for dollar of all ac-
counts. The state bank commissioner employed an auditing 
company to make an audit of the books and records of the 
bank. The actual work of the audit, was done by Mr. 
Guiver. Mr. Guiver testified that he spent forty-five days 
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in making the audit and preparing his report; that he made 
a complete audit of the bank's condition for 1928, and went 
back over the books for 1927 and on certain accounts he 
went back several years. He testified that he found a short-
age of $88,652.45 as of Saturday March 24, 1928. Of this 
amount $54,694.45 was in the savings accounts, $25,305.50 
was in the checking accounts, and $8,242.50 was in the 
notes. The witness also testified that he was able to trace 
certain credits, amounting to the sum of $1,330, as shown 
by the passbook of Mrs. Drown, should have been posted to 
her savings account, but which was deflected instead to the 
credit of the defendant's account. This consisted mainly of 
$35 monthly deposits made by Mrs. Drown beginning with 
October, 1924, and then continued to almost the end of the 
account. 
On the state's offer, there were received in evidence the 
bank's ledger of the savings account of Mrs. Drown, con-
sisting of ledger leaves marked as Exhibits A and B, also 
her passbook, marked as Exhibit C. On Exhibit B is shown 
a debit entry or charge of $1,000 as of January 2, 1926. It 
is to this transaction that the prosecution anchors its case. 
It is admitted by counsel for defendant that Exhibit C is 
Mrs. Drown's passbook, and that the $1,000 was not drawn 
out of the bank by Mrs. Drown or at her instance and re-
quest. The amount of Mrs. Drown's account as of January 
2,1926, as shown by her passbook, was $8,960. The amount 
as shown by the bank's ledger of this account as of that 
date is $2,201.28, making a difference of $6,763.72 that her 
account was short. The shortage of this account as of 
March 24, 1928, was $9,580.04, and this amount was re-
flected in the general shortage of the bank. Mr. Taylor 
testified that this particular entry appeared to be in Mr. 
Anderson's handwriting. He also testified that a number 
of the entries appeared to be in defendant's handwriting. 
It is shown that, in computing interest on a savings ac-
count, the practice followed by banks generally is to com-
pute the interest on the amount shown by the bank ledger, 
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and that the figures representing the interest would be 
copied from the ledger to the depositor's passbook. In this 
case, for the purpose of the bank's record, the interest was 
computed according to the amount sho\wi by the bank's 
ledger and for Mrs. Drown the interest was computed ac-
cording to the amount shown by her passbook. 
The first ground of complaint relates to the shortage and 
the manner in which the term was employed during the 
trial. The appellant complains because, in his opening state-
ment, the district attorney told the jury the state 
would show that there was a shortage of $88,152.45 1-3 
of the funds of the bank on March 24, 1928, that the 
bank examiners and expert accountant were permitted to 
testify to such shortage, and that a number of witnesses 
were permitted to testify concerning statements and admis-
sions made by the accused as to the existence of the short-
age at the meeting held at the bank Monday March 26, 
1928. The appellant gives as his reason for this contention 
that it was never "clearly shown that these shortages were 
caused by money" or other assets "leaving the bank" 
through appellant's fraudulent conduct "or simply by poor 
loans that were charged off." Appellant further asserts 
that "not one of the auditors wanted to testify as to just 
what was meant by shortage." This contention does not 
correctly reflect the record in that connection. As cashier 
of the bank, appellant was undoubtedly thoroughly familiar 
with any transaction where a bad loan had been accounted 
for as a shortage rather than, as is usual, to charge the 
same off as a loss. Yet in his brief he has directed our 
attention to but two instances where he claims that such 
was done. In the first instance he refers to the loan to 
Childers Leasing Company. There is not a word of evi-
dence in the record as to what this transaction was or how 
it was disposed of except reference is made to it as a "poor 
loan" by counsel for appellant in his cross-examination of 
Mr. Chipman. Counsel asked, "They told you the shortage 
started when they made that poor loan?" The witness 
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answered, "I think that Mr. Anderson did." In this question 
and answer we have all that the record discloses concerning 
this transaction, yet much of appellant's briefs are devoted 
to it. Appellant never once asserted that the shortage he 
was talking about in his conversations with the board of 
directors of the bank and the bank examiners at the meet-
ing March 24, 1928, was occasioned, wholly or in part by 
losses which were caused or sustained by "poor loans." He 
designated the situation as "something wrong" and some-
thing to be concealed from the bank examiners and direc-
tors. Even though we assume that defendant would be 
entitled to any exculpatory statements made by Anderson in 
connection with the admission or statement made by the 
latter in connection with his admission or statement that 
ie had assisted the defendant to manipulate the books to 
prevent detection of their "wrongs," the statement made by 
Anderson dees not justify the inference that the loan, if 
;here were a loan, entered into or became a part of the 
shortage. It rather fixes the circumstance or transaction 
:o-ordinate in point of time with the inception or beginning 
>f the shortage. Were it a loan, even though a poor one, 
here would unmistakably be a corresponding asset in the 
orm of a promissory note or other obligation to pay. At 
east such is what we have to assume in the absence of 
urther information concerning the matter. It should be 
:ept in mind that, whatever was the result of the alleged 
ransaction, it was more than ten years before the audit 
fas made by Mr. Guiver. 
Our attention is also directed to what counsel for ap-
ellant has called the Steadman note for $3,000 face value, 
igned by Mr. Steadman and two of his sons. Mr. Guiver 
tated that when he made the audit all three signers were 
ailed in, and that they denied having signed the note, and 
lid that their signatures thereto were forgeries. Upon 
le assumption that it was a forged instrument, the note 
as not treated by Guiver in his audit as an asset, as it 
ould have been had the signatures been genuine. It is 
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obvious that in so treating the note the shortage was in-
creased proportionately. There is no evidence in the record 
to show that the signatures to the note are genuine. Mr. 
Guiver, however, testified on cross-examination that he had 
heard since he made the audit that the signers of the note 
had acknowledged their signatures to the note as being 
genuine. In the event that the signatures are genuine, the 
only result would be that the shortage would be reduced in 
the amount of the note. 
In reference to the statement of appellant that "no one 
of the auditors wanted to testify as to just what was meant 
by shortage," the answer of the witness to whom the direct 
question was put as to what they meant when they em-
ployed the term or used the words "shortage" in their testi-
mony may be of material assistance in determining this 
phase of the question. Mr. Burgon, testifying of the short-
age in the savings accounts as shown on Monday February 
26, 1928, in answer to a direct question put to him by ap-
pellant's attorney, said: "The bank ledger showed more 
than the control account by $33,000.00. That is, the savings 
ledger showed that much more than the control ledger had 
apportioned to the savings account. * * * The control ac-
count had to be correct because that represented the amount 
of money that we had." Mr. Taylor, in stating what he 
meant by shortage, said: "I mean that either the assets 
as shown by the (bank) statement are not all accounted for 
or the liabilities are greater than the liabilities accounted 
for". "But," asked counsel for appellant, "that does not 
mean that any of the officials of the bank got the money?" 
To this the witness answered: "It means that somebody 
got it." Upon further cross-examination, the witness stated 
he did not know what made up the shortage, but he knew 
it was not poor loans, as they would not have been shown 
in that way. It could only mean that the proper credits 
were not shown or the proper assets were not accounted 
for. Mr. Hadlock, the state bank examiner, after testify-
ing as to the respective amounts of the shortages in the 
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checking accounts, the savings accounts and the notes, and 
how himself and those he had helping him had arrived at 
these amounts, said that when he referred to such "short-
ages" he meant the difference between the liabilities as 
reflected in the individual checking accounts, individual 
savings accounts, and the assets as shown by the notes com-
pared with the control total of the bank's statement in 
reference to those same accounts, and, when the liabilities 
as shown in the checking accounts and savings accounts 
exceeded the amount apportioned to those accounts in the 
control account and the assets represented by the notes 
were less than those represented in the control account, 
there was a diminution of the assets of the bank to the ex-
tent of the difference in those various accounts. 
It is certain from the record before us that there was a 
very considerable shortage, competent and uncontradicted 
evidence showing the amount to be $88,152.15. It is equally 
certain from the record that the shortage was not made up, 
either in whole or in part, by losses due to poor loans, with 
the possible exception of what has been designated the 
Steadman note, which, as we have seen, was treated as a 
forged note. It may not improperly be here stated that the 
losses arising from poor loans should not, under any known 
system of bookkeeping, affect the amounts due the indivi-
dual depositors so as to reflect a shortage in their individual 
accounts with the bank such as was done in Mrs. Drown's 
account. This could not arise except by the clearest and 
most open kind of pilfering by some one. 
Evidence that reasonably tends to establish the facts 
sought to be proved is relevant and is admissible unless for-
bidden by some one of the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
Counsel for appellant have not called our attention 
to any rule or principle excluding the fact that there 4-6 
is such a shortage, and there is none which presents 
itself to our minds. The bank does not keep the money 
which it receives from its depositors in separate individual 
21 
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funds corresponding with the depositors. It is all mingled 
together in one account. It is not necessary to allege or 
prove from whom the defendant, as the agent of the bank, 
received the money which is the subject of the embezzle-
ment. It is sufficient to show that out of the gross sum 
of money received by him as such he has embezzled a por-
tion. It would seem that there could be no doubt but that 
a general shortage or deficiency in the cash account of the 
bank would tend very materially to establish such a case. 
State v. Meeker, 72 N. J. Law, 210, 61 A. 381; People V. 
Maljan, 34 Cal. App. 384, 167 P. 547; State V. Hasledahl, 
3 N. D. 36, 53 N. W. 430. 
Appellant also complains of the remoteness of the short-
age which was shown, and contends that "the fact of a 
general shortage two years and three months subsequent 
to the alleged embezzlement of $1,000.00 is no evidence at 
all of the commission of that crime and is highly 
prejudicial." There is no merit to appellant's con- 7 
tention in this regard. By his own admission the 
shortage began back ten years before, and approximately 
eight years before the offense charged in the information 
was committed. From the evidence in the case, it seems 
certain that the amount of the shortage grew constantly 
larger with each succeeding year. It is conclusively estab-
lished that on January 2, 1926, Mrs. Drown's account, as 
we have already stated in this opinion, was short $6,763.72, 
and by March 24, 1928, the shortage in that account had 
increased to $9,589.04 and was reflected in the general 
shortage. 
It is also urged that the trial court erred in admitting 
over objection evidence of the statements and admissions 
made by defendant concerning the shortage and the means 
resorted to by him to escape detection by the state bank 
examiner before the corpus delicti had been estab-
lished. Ordinarily, when the state seeks to introduce 8 
evidence of extrajudicial statements or admissions of 
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the defendant connecting him with the commission of the 
crime charged, the corpus delicti should be first proved. 
But, inasmuch as the order of proof is largely within the 
discretion of the trial court, it is not error, in the absence 
of a showing that the defendant will be prejudiced thereby, 
to permit evidence of statements and admissions of the de-
fendant implicating him with the crime charged before the 
existence of the corpus delicti is established, if, as was done 
in this case, the corpus delicti was subsequently proved. 
People V. Barnnovich, 16 Cal. App. 427, 117 P. 572; People 
v. Svjaile, 12 Cal. App. 192, 107 P. 134; People v. Wagner, 
29 Cal. App. 363, 155 P. 649; State V. James, 96 N. J. Law, 
132, 114 A. 553, 16 A. L. R. 1141; People v. Saunders, 13 
Cal. 743, 110 P. 825; 16 C. J. p. 865, § 2180; Id. p. 737, § 
1514, subheading "Order of Proof." Certainly in the 
present case the corpus delicti was established beyond a 
reasonable doubt by evidence aside from and independent 
of the statements and admissions of the accused. The testi-
mony of the bank examiners and the auditor showed the 
shortage existing in three different funds of the bank. 
Their testimony showed that credits which should have 
been posted to Mrs. Drowns ledger account were deflected 
to the defendant's individual account; that her ledger ac-
count had been falsified by unauthorized debit charges and 
by omitting to post credits therein which should have been 
posted. Daily reports were also falsified by making the 
loans and discounts show an excess over the actual amount 
of notes in the bank, and the individual checking and sav-
ings accounts shown by such statements were less by many 
thousands of dollars than the liabilities as actually reflected 
in the individual ledger accounts. In all of this there is not 
a single feature that can be accounted for on any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence. 
Over defendant's objection to the effect that the questions 
called for conclusions of the witnesses and that the books 
were the best evidence, the court permitted each of the bank 
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examiners. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Hadlock, and also 
Mr. Guiver, the accountant, to give the results of 9 
their examinations of the books and records of the 
Midvale State Bank bearing upon the shortages in various 
funds of the bank and also the shortage in the savings ac-
count of Mrs. Drown. These rulings are made the subject 
of a considerable number of assignments. We find no error 
in the court's rulings here complained of. The witnesses 
were all expert accountants, and employed their time ex-
clusively in examining books and records of banks and other 
business institutions. Their conclusions were based entirely 
on the books and records of the bank as they had found 
them upon their examination of them. It is well settled 
that where the original evidence consists of books of ac-
count, records, and papers which might properly be used 
in evidence are numerous and voluminous and cannot be 
satisfactorily or conveniently examined in court, it is com-
petent for any qualified person who has examined them to 
testify as to the result of such examination with regard to 
the subject under investigation. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. 
Ry Co. v. Woodbury Glass Co. (Ind. App.) 120 N. E. 426, 
page 433; People v. Moone, 334 111. 590, 166 N. E. 481, page 
487; 2 Wigmore, Ev., § 1230 (first and second edition); 16 
C. J. p. 615, § 1211; 22 C. J. p. 1017, § 1303; People v. Saw-
hill, 299 111. 393, 132 N. E. 477. 
Counsel for appellant further insist that there were no 
books of record in court and that appellant was entitled to 
have them there for the reason that there was no showing 
made that the books could not have been produced in 
court. The record shows that there were received in 10 
evidence the ledger account of Mrs. Drown's savings 
account, her passbook, the daily cash statement of the bank, 
eight reports or statements of the condition of the bank, 
several sheets of the daily blotter, and that at the conclusion 
of the direct examination of Mr. Hadlock, Mr. Moyle special 
counsel for the state said to counsel for defendant, "I will 
say we will produce any record counsel may desire," to 
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which there was no response of any kind. Subsequently, 
at the request of defendant's counsel, there were brought 
into court a large number of paid checks of Leon L. Olson, 
the defendant, and also paid checks of the Tenabo Mining 
Company and a teller's blotter for January 5, 1926. In 
answer to questions put to him by appellant's attorney, Mr. 
Guiver stated that he did not have all of the books in court 
that he had used in making the audit; that he did have, 
however, all those supporting his claim of shortage and all 
those which tended to show and by which he was enabled 
to allocate portions of the general shortage that reflected 
themselves in the checking account of Leon L. Olson and 
Olson Bros., Incorporated. Appellant does not complain 
because the books were not introduced in evidence, but only 
because they were not present in court; yet the only case 
referred to by him on the subject is State v. Paulson, 27 S. 
D. 24, 129 N. W. 558, where the statement is made that, 
"in cases wherein examination and compensation may be 
shown, the rules of evidence require the records themselves 
to be offered in connection therewith." On the question as 
to whether the original books and papers must be intro-
duced in evidence in connection with the testimony of an 
expert accountant or other competent person in giving the 
result of his examination thereof, there seems to be some 
conflict of opinion among the authorities. Prof. Wigmore, 
in speaking on this question, says: "Most courts require, 
as a condition, that the mass thus summarily testified to 
shall, if the occasion seem to require it, be placed at hand 
in court, or at least be made accessible to the opposing 
party; in order that the correctness of the evidence may be 
tested by inspection if desired, or that the material for 
cross-examination may be available." 2 Wigmore, Ev. (2d 
Ed.) § 1230. See, also, 16 C. J. p. 617, § 1211. Sound rea-
son dictates and the authorities hold that, if the books are 
accessible and can be brought into court, opposing counsel 
should have every reasonable opportunity to examine them 
and to use them on cross-examination so that he may ascer-
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tain the correctness of the conclusion of the person, testify-
ing as to the result of his examination of the originals. 
There is no reason why this may not be done if the books 
are present in court or are otherwise satisfactorily made 
available to opposing counsel without having them all in-
troduced in evidence in the first instance. Furthermore, 
if all the books and records are not present in court, or are 
not satisfactorily made available to opposing counsel, they 
may be brought into court or be otherwise made available 
to opposing counsel by a proper application to the court for 
an order requiring that that be done. As we read the ad-
judicated cases, such seems to be the prevailing practice 
where all the records are not already before the court. 
People v. Moone, supra; Inter-State Finance Corp. v. Com-
mercial Jewelry Co., 280 111. 116, 117 N. E. 440; Elmira 
Roofing Co. V. Gould, 71 Conn. 629, 42 A. 1002. 
As the situation is presented by the record in the present 
case, it appears that all of the books which were examined 
by Mr. Guiver, the auditor, were not present in the court-
room. As hereinbefore stated, in addition to the books, 
statements, and accounts received in evidence and Mr. 
Moyle's proffer to produce any record counsel might desire, 
there were present in court all the books and records neces-
sary to show the shortage and also those from which the 
auditor said he was able to allocate portions of the shortage 
to certain individual accounts. In such a situation, if the 
appellant had desired any additional books and records, he 
should have applied to the court to require the state to 
produce them before he may be heard to complain that all 
the books actually examined by the auditor were not present 
in court. Instead of requesting the state's attorney for 
such additional books or accounts as appellant might have 
desired and in the event that such request was of no avail 
applying to the court for an order requiring the state's 
attorney to produce them, only this veiled request was made 
by appellant of the witness Guiver near the end of the 
^ L _ _ _ _ _ i ^ ^
 599 
Appeal from Third District 
cross-examination of that witness, as appears in the record before us. 
"Now, in the morning will you bring me all of the records you 
used in making a compilation of your audi;? I want to cross-examine 
you on that. A. All of the records I used? 
"Q. Yes. A. May I ask Mr. Moyle (special counsel for the state) a question? 
"No, he has got nothing to do with my cross-examination, ask 
me? A. May I ask you how I can get some of the records from the 
Mid vale State Bank? 
"Q. If we could get them, we have no control over h. A. I don't know how I will get them." 
Later, in reference to this same subject, the record shows 
that this colloquy was had : 
"The Court: I understood from the line of questioning you were 
not expecting the witness to bring those books in. 
"Mr. James (Counsel for defendant) : I differ from the Court's 
ruling, if they are willing to stand on the way they present their 
case I am. 
"The Court: The question of whether or not you want the books brought in— 
"Mr. James: I will leave the burden to the state. 
"The Court: You are not asking for them. 
"Mr. James: I am making the suggestion that you get them." 
In our opinion the foregoing was not sufficient request 
upon the state's attorney to have other books or records 
brought into court or otherwise made available to the de-
fendant for this examination and use at the trial. Neither 
was it, in the event of a refusal or a failure on the part of 
the prosecution to produce them, a sufficient application to 
the court for an order requiring the books and records 
brought in. Therefore appellant may not at this time be 
heard to complain because other or additional books which 
he might have desired to use at the trial were not there. 
The court has ample power and authority to have required 
the prosecution to have the books that are accessible brought 
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into court for the use of the defendant and undoubtedly 
would have exercised its jurisdiction in this regard had it 
been properly invoked by appellant. 
Appellant's next contention goes to the extent to which 
the experts were permitted to testify from their respective 
examinations. Stating the contention in the langauge of 
appellant's brief, it is this : The expert "was allowed 
to testify * * * as to the amount and falsity of en- 11-13 
tries and as to what he thought of them; the appel-
lant claiming that an accountant cannot give his opinion 
as to what the entry was but only as to the entry and as 
to the result of his calculation." Under this general ob-
jection, fourteen of the fifty-two separtely stated assign-
ments of error have been grouped. We have examined all 
of the assignments so grouped in the light of the foregoing 
criticism, and except for assignments numbered 26, 27, and 
28, none of them is subject to such objection. By assign-
ment No. 26 it is shown that Mr. Guiver was asked whether 
he was able to state if any of the general shortage reflects 
itself in the personal checking account of Leon L. Olson. 
The court overruling the objection that the question called 
for a conclusion of the witness and that the records speak 
for themselves, the witness answered, "Yes sir." Con-
sidered a preliminary question seeking the opinion of the 
witness as an expert accountant as to whether, according 
to the correct practice of accountancy, he was able to state 
from the examination of the books and accounts of the bank 
that he had made any portion of the shortage was reflected 
in the personal checking account of Mr. Olson, the question 
is not subject to appellant's objection. But counsel for the 
state is then expected to follow it up and develop with some 
particularity just how the witness was able to ascertain 
such fact from the books and records and accounts of the 
bank so that the trial judge may determine as a matter of 
law whether there was any competent probative value to 
the finding of the witness in such particular in order that 
he might know whether to submit it to or withhold it from 
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the jury. This was not done, and the answer stands in the 
record as a mere conclusion. It is then followed up with a 
question directing the witness to examine his report made 
to the state bank commissioner containing the result of the 
witness' audit of the bank books and records to refresh his 
memory and give the amount thus reflected. Over the ob-
jection that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, 
the witness was permitted to answer "$6,379.00." That is 
the subject of the twenty-seventh assignment. As before 
stated, it is incompetent for the reason that as it stands it 
is but the conclusion of the witness. Accountants and other 
competent persons are permitted as a matter of convenience 
to state what the books contain or what they do not contain 
(San Pedro L. Co. V. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74, 53 P. 410), if 
the negative is relevant, as it often is, and as it undoubtedly 
was in this particular instance. It may be true that an 
expert accountant, by an examination of Mr. Olson's check-
ing account and all the credit slips with reference thereto, 
might find an insufficient number of credit slips to make 
up the total amount of credits which had actually been 
posted to the credit of this account. He might also find in 
his examination of the credit slips pertaining to other in-
dividual accounts that credits had not been posted to those 
accounts corresponding with the credit slips, but that cor-
responding amounts at about the same time had been posted 
as credits in Mr. Olson's account. This would all have 
cogent probative value, and most certainly should be per-
mitted to go to the jury. To have made the state's question 
competent, the witness would have had to lay before the 
court and jury such facts which he found or failed to find 
in the books and which led him to the conclusion that 
$6,370 of the general shortage was traceable to the Olson 
account. Assignment No. 28 involves the same principle. 
Though we find there was error in this particular, we are 
unable to see how it could have been prejudicial, under the 
state of the record in this case. This information errone-
ously placed before the jury tended to connect the defen-
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dant with the general shortage, and nothing else. His 
connection is, as we think, established, if not conclusively, 
at least beyond a reasonable doubt, by his own admissions 
upon three occasions, as is shown in the statement of the 
evidence. Such error, under the foregoing facts, was not 
prejudicial. 
Further assignments of error are predicated on the 
court's refusal to give certain requested instructions to the 
jury. We have made a careful examination of each of the 
requests as well as the statements of counsel in connection 
therewith. We find each of the assignments to be without 
merit. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
CHERRY, C. J., and STRAUP, ELIAS HANSEN, and 
FOLLAND, JJ., concur. 
INDEX 
ACTION. 
PLAINTIFF WAIVING COXTERSIOX AND CLAIMING PROCEEDS RATIFIED 
SALE OF AUTOMOBILE BY DEFENDANT. Where plaintiff, in action 
to recover damages for conversion of automobile, in its amended 
complaint waived tort and claimed proceeds of sale, it thereby 
ratified and approved sale of automobile by defendant. Taylor 
Motor Car Co. V. Hansen, SO. 
ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF. See "Limitation of Actions." 
ADMINISTRATORS. See "Executors and Administrators." 
APPEAL AND ERROR. See "Criminal Law." 
1. TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANTS" EMPLOYEE REQUESTED PLAINTIFF, 
KICKED BY HORSE, TO DRIVE EO?.SE INTO BARN, WITHOUT PROOF 
OF EMPLOYEE'S AUTHORITY, HELD PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS.. 
In action for injuries to bey kicked by horse belonging to defen-
dants as copartners, testimony that person employed by defen-
dants to drive milk wagon requested plaintiff and his com-
panion to drive horse into the barn, without proof of such em-
ployee's authority, held prejudicial as having a tendency not only 
to influence general verdict for plaintiff but also jury's answers 
to interrogatories submitted Lc'sney V. Bingham Dairy et aL, 53. 
2. TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IN LAW CASES ARE APPROVED, IF SUP-
PORTED BY SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE. In law cases, find-
ings of trial court are approved if there is sufficient competent 
evidence to support them, and are not disturbed, unless it is 
manifest that they are so clearly against weight of evidence as 
to indicate a misconception, or nc~ a due consideration of it. Jen-
sen et aL V. Howell et at, 64. 
3. APPEAL IN EQUITY CASES IS IN EFFECT TRIAL D E NOVO, AND 
IF TRIAL COURT'S FINDING? AEE AGAINST GREATER WEIGHT OF 
EVIDENCE THEY WILL BE DISAPPROVED. Appeals in equity cases are 
in effect trial de novo on the record, and, if after making due 
allowance as to better opportunely of trial court to observe de-
meanor of witnesses, their credibility, and weight of their testi-
mony, appellate court is persuaded that trial court's findings are 
against preponderance or clear weight of evidence, appellate court 
will disprove it, and make or direct a finding, or remand case 
for further proceedings. Id. 
4. SUBMITTING IMMATERIAL ISSUE WHETHER AUTOMOBILE DEFENDANT 
RESOLD WAS CONDITIONALLY PURCHASED FROM PLAINTIFF, A S K -
ING ACCOUNTING, HELD NOT HARMFUL TO PLAINTIFF. Where issue 
of whether automobile defendant sold had been conditionally sold 
75 Utah! 
STATr 
Cite «• 
2 Utah 2d 371 
Th« STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jay D. FERRY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8(81. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 26, 1054. 
Defendant was convicted of carnal 
knowledge. The Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Millard County, Will L. Iloyt, J., 
rendered judgment on the verdict, and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Hcnriod, J., held that a deputy sheriff's 
testimony that defendant answered "ycs" 
when the girl involved inquired if it were 
right that they had relations was not in-
dependent evidence of quantum and quality 
required to prove the corpus delicti before 
defendant's confession may be used to es-
tablish his guilt, where the girl refused to 
appear at the trial and subject herself to 
cross-examination. 
Judgment reversed with instructions. 
1. Criminal Law €=535(2), 538(3) 
An accused cannot be convicted on his 
confession alone, but there must also be 
independent, clear and convincing evidence 
of corpus delicti, though it need not be con-
vincing beyond reasonable doubt. 
2. Criminal Law 0=406(1), 517(4) 
In prosecution for carnal knowledge, 
deputy sheriff's testimony that defendant 
answered "yes" when girl involved, who 
refused to appear at trial and subject her-
self to cross-examination, inquired if it 
were right that she and defendant had rela-
tions, was not independent evidence of 
quantum and quality required to prove 
corpus delicti before defendant's confession 
may be used to establish his guilt, though 
admissible under exception to hearsay rule. 
I. 127 A.L.R. 1131. 
2. In Stnte v. Wells. 1000, ,T> Utah 400, 
100 P. f>81, 13G Am.St.Rrp. 1050. 10 Ann. 
Ca*. 631, wc hold the independent evi-
dence must prove the corpus delicti be-
yond a reasonable doubt; in State v. 
Johnson. 1938, 05 Utah 572, 83 I\2d 
1010, wc softened that rule by Baying 
such proof need not be conclusive; we 
T T - . ^ Y Utah 173 
3. Criminal Law C^5I7(4) 
In prosecution for carnal knowledge, 
which defendant confessed in writing, 
deputy sheriff's testimony that defendant 
answered "yes" v. hen girl involved inquired 
if it were right that they had relations was 
merely evidence of second confession, 
which alone could not be used to prove 
corpus delicti, as required before confession 
may be used to establish defendant's guilt. 
Aldrich & Bullock, Provo, for appellant. 
E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L. 
Budge, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from a carnal knowledge convic-
tion. Reversed with instructions to grant 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Only facts requiring documentation here 
substantially arc as follows: Defendant 
confessed in writing, and, according to a 
deputy sheriff's testimony, answered "yes" 
when the girl in question inquired if it were 
right that the two had relations. The gi^l 
and her mother refused to attend the trial 
which proceeded after denial of a prosecu-
tion motion for a continuance. 
[1] An accused cannot be convicted on 
his confession alone. l Wc believe and hold 
that in addition there must be independent, 
clear and convincing evidence of the corpus 
delicti,2 although wc and the authorities 
generally do not require it to be convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 
[2] The only independent evidence 
which might tend to establish a corpus 
delicti and lend credence to the confession 
here, is the testimony of the deputy, the 
substance of which, at best, was the 'state-
ment of a person that refused to appear 
enunciate the rule in our present deci-
sion, to clarify the matter, feeling that 
such rule, already announced in Arizona 
in Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 00, 207 P. 
1029, is the soundest of those heretofore 
enuueiated by the authorities. See also. 
State v. Crank, 1043. 105 Utah 332, 142 
r.2d 178. 170 A.L.R. 542. 
3. 127 A.L.R. 1130. 
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and subject herself to cross-examination, 
thus precluding any test of the truth of the 
iitatement purportedly made or the veracity 
of the one who made it. Such hearsay, 
even though admissible under an exception 
to the hearsay rule,4 but of doubtful ma-
teriality in this case, in our opinion falls far 
short of the quantum and quality of inde-
pendent evidence which the authorities re-
quire in proving the corpus delicti before 
a confession may be used to establish guilt. 
To hold otherwise would open the door to 
possible injustice from the fabricated testi-
mony of one, who, knowing that a person 
could not or would not appear to testify, 
and without fear of recrimination, easily 
could put words in the mouth of an absentee 
that could be highly prejudicial to an ac-
4. 20 Am.Jur. 483, 
cuscd when viewed in the light of the 
lattcr's confession. Our traditional zeal in 
safeguarding the rights of an accused 
would preclude conviction on such an un-
substantial basis. 
[3] Besides the above, the evidence 
adduced by the deputy's statement was that 
merely of a second confession. To say a 
second confession, with nothing more, could 
be used to prove the corpus delicti, obvious-
ly would be to devour the rule itself, which 
is predicated on the fact that one confession 
alone, with nothing more, cannot prove the 
corpus delicti,—there being no magic or 
significance to a repetition thereof. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
WADE and WORTIIEN, JJ., concur. 
Sec. 570, Evidence. 
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den. In that case, however, the trial court 
dismissed the robbery charge on its own 
volition. That is not the case here. 
The District Attorney's office, an arm 
of the state, and under the direct super-
vision of the Attorney General (67-5-1), 
that is appealing here,—a somewhat un-
orthodox and inconsistent circumstance,— 
made the motion to dismiss the action, 
which at that point was as much an issue 
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would 
seem that before this court orders the 
trial court to do much of anything the 
matter of that motion to dismiss and the 
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably 
good cause, should be resolved. 
In addition to the position I take on the 
aspect of this case reflected in the para-
graph immediately above, I urge that per-
haps we made a mistake in the remand 
portion of the McGuffey case and that we 
should overrule that part of it. The in-
stant case itself seems to point up the ad-
visability of so doing. To do anything 
more could lead us on safari in a civil 
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile 
juristic jungle of no return. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12278. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 6, 1971. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K. 
Swan, J., of being in actual physical con-
trol of his vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that 
defendant who was asleep in his automo-
bile which was completely off traveled por-
tion of highway and whose motor was not 
running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle" in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. 
Reversed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Automobiles C=332 
Defendant who was asleep in his auto-
mobile which was completely off traveled 
portion of highway and whose motor was 
not running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle" in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Flor-
ence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren 
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was found guilty of a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953, 
and from that conviction he has appealed 
to this court. 
During the night of July 28, 1969, the 
defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked upon the shoulder of * 
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis 
County. The automobile was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway 
and the motor was not running. An officcf 
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene 
and discovered the defendant was asleep 
With some effort the officer succeeded >*J 
awakening the defendant, at which time tn 
officer detected the smell of alcohol an 
STATE V. BUGGER 
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rrested the defendant for being in actual 
hysical control of the vehicle while under 
^c influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The complaint charges the defendant 
with the violation of the statute above re-
ferred to which provides as follows: 
It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section 
for any person who is under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be 
in actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state. 
The defendant is here challenging the 
validity of the statute on the grounds of 
vagueness. However, we need not decide 
the case upon that ground.LThat part of 
the statute which states: "be in actual phys-
ical control of any vehicle" has been be-
fore the courts of other jurisdictions which 
have statutes with similar wordings. The 
word "actual" has been defined as mean-
ing "existing in act or reality; * * * in 
action or existence at the time being; 
present; * * *." The word "physical" 
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is de-
fined as "to exercise restraining or direct-
ing influence over; to dominate; regulate; 
hence, to hold from actions; to curb." 
The term in "actual physical control" in 
its ordinary sense means "existing" or 
"present bodily restraint, directing influ-
ence, domination or regulation." £J It is 
clear that in the record before us the facts 
do not bring the case within the wording 
of the statute. The defendant at the time 
of his arrest was not controlling the ve-
hicle, nor was he exercising any dominion 
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by 
the plaintiff in support of its position in 
this matter deal with entirely different fact 
situations, such as the case where the driver 
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled 
portion of the highway; or where the mo-
tor of the vehicle was operating; or where 
the driver was attempting to steer the auto-
mobile while it was in motion; or where 
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wil*us, Com.Pl., 
he was attempting to brake the vehicle to 
arrest its motion. 
We are of the opinion that the facts in 
this case do not make out a violation of 
the statute and the defendant's conviction 
is reversed. We do not consider it neces-
sary to discuss the other claimed errors 
raised by the defendant. 
CALLISTER, C J., and HENRIOD 
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The statute formerly made it unlawful 
for a person under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any 
highway within this state.1 The amendment 
added a provision making it unlawful to 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a 
highway before the crime was made out 
and did away with the necessity of driving 
before a crime was committed. 
The reason for the change is obvious. 
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person 
in charge of an automobile from getting 
on the highway than it is to punish him 
after he gets on it. The amended statute 
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk 
person in the control of an automobile and 
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc 
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from 
injuring himself by his erratic driving. 
It does not matter whether the motor 
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk 
is in the front seat or in the back seat. 
His potentiality for harm is lessened but 
not obviated by a silent motor or a back-
seat position—provided, of course, that he 
is the one in control of the car. It only 
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor 
or to engage the gears, and it requires only 
a moment of time to get under the wheel 
from the back seat. A drunk in control 
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl. 
CrApp.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582. 
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933. 
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity 
to cause harm that the statute intended to 
make it criminal for him to be in a position 
to do so. 
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Restraining the movement of a vehicle 
is controlling it as much as moving it is. 
A person finding a drunk in the back seat 
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely 
to learn who is in control of that car if 
he should attempt to move it. A drunk 
may maliciously block one's exit, and in 
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle. 
I think the defendant in this case was in 
control of his truck within the meaning of 
the statute even though he may have been 
asleep. He had the key and was the only 
one who could drive it. The fact that he 
chose to park it is no reason to say he was 
not in control thereof. 
I, therefore, think that we should con-
sider the question which he raises in his 
brief as to the validity of the statute. 
Cases wherein an attack was made on 
statutes like ours have been decided in a 
number of jurisdictions. They hold the 
statute good 
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was 
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked 
next to some barricades in a lane of traf-
fic. An officer passed by and observed 
no one in the car. Later he returned and 
found the defendant "passed out." The 
statute made it a crime to be in actual 
physical control of a car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The de-
fendant contended that the wording of the 
statute was not meant to apply to a situa-
tion where the car was parked and that it 
was only concerned with the driving of an 
automobile and other acts and conduct of a 
positive nature. In holding that the statute 
was applicable to the conduct of the defend-
ant, the court said: 
An intoxicated person seated behind 
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is 
a threat to the safety and welfare of 
the public. The danger is less than that 
In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d 
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a statute 
making it unlawful for "any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical 
control of any motor vehicle within this 
state," There the defendant (appellant) 
claimed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional in that it was so vague and indefinite 
that a person charged thereunder would be 
deprived of due process of law. The court 
held that the statute did not violate any 
of appellant's constitutional rights. 
Under a similar statute the Montana Su-
preme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the 
statute was not void for vagueness, and in 
doing so said: 
* * * Thus one could have "actual 
physical control" while merely parking 
or standing still so long as one was 
keeping the car in restraint or in posi-
tion to regulate its movements. Prevent-
ing a car from moving is as much control 
and dominion as actually putting the car 
in motion on the highway. Could one 
exercise any more regulation over a 
thing, while bodily present, than preven-
tion of movement or curbing movement. 
As long as one were physically or bodily 
able to assert dominion, in the sense of 
movement, then he has as much control 
over an object as he would if he were 
actually driving the vehicle. 
* * * [I]t is quite evident that the 
statute in the instant c a s s i s neither 
vague nor uncertain. * 
The appellant here claims some federally 
protected rights in that he says he was >m-
properly arrested. It is difficult for me ° 
see where that has anything to do w'th 
guilt or innocence. If he were .mproperly 
arrested, he would have an actum again* 
,he officer for false arrest, but surely e £ 
courts have not lost contact tnth « * « J 
t 0 the extent that we turn a gu.l y ma" 
* , ~ trniDlv "because the constable tna> 
From what has been said 
Hs absolutely no merit to th 
[being in control of an aut< 
•> under the influence of intox 
^ the defendant was guilty of < 
which was in the presence < 
and the officer had a right 
arrest him.* 
* The defendant was found 
court below of being in s 
control of his truck while 
the influence of intoxicatii 
does not dispute that he was 
statute is good, we should 
overrule the trier of the 
that the defendant was not 
u
' controlling his truck. 
I would affirm the judgr 
court. 
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the Sixth District Cour 
Ferdinand Erickson, J., 
ceased was covered bj 
The Supreme Court, He 
where farmer was woi 
farm tractor located on 
% and it rolled forwarc 
,he was "pedestrian" wit 
injury "sustained in coi 
^struck by any land com 
" dorian." 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented 
m what has been said above, there 
k absolutely no merit to this claim. By 
. ;n control of an automobile while 
Vder the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
T defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor 
rhich was in the presence of the officer, 
Jnd the officer had a right and a duty to 
Arrest him 2 
•""•The defendant was found guilty in the 
Fcourt below of being in actual physical 
Iftontrol of his truck while he was under 
aUe influence of intoxicating liquor. He 
ifdoes not dispute that he was drunk. If the 
^statute is good, we should not attempt to 
Overrule the trier of the facts and find 
*\hat the defendant was not the one actual-
l y controlling his truck. 
^ I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
jr court. 
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Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
c: corporation, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12187. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1971. 
Appeal by insurer from judgment of 
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County, 
Ferdinand Enckson, J., holding that de-
ceased was covered by accident policy. 
[The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that 
where farmer was working about idling 
f^arm tractor located on his private proper-
ty and it rolled forward and crushed him, 
jhe was "pedestrian" within policy covering 
injury "sustained in consequence of being 
struck by any land conveyance while a pe-
destrian." 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Insurance <S=>452 
Person on foot does not cease to be 
"pedestrian" within policy covering inju-
ries sustained while a pedestrian merely 
because he is not in motion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Insurance <S=5452 
Where farmer was working about 
idling farm tractor located on his private 
property and it rolled forward and crushed 
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy 
covering injury "sustained in consequence 
of being struck by any land conveyance 
while a pedestrian." 
Thomas S. Taylor, of Chnstensen, Tay-
lor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain, 
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from what was labeled a summa-
ry judgment for plaintiff which actually 
was a judgment on all available facts, un-
der an insurance policy covering injury 
"sustained in consequence of being struck 
by any land conveyance while a pedestri-
an." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. 
Believable evidence elicited under the 
discovery process indicates that plaintiffs 
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor 
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all 
of which occurred on his private property. 
The only question is whether the de-
ceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms 
of the policy. The trial court said he was, 
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no 
one questioning the fact that the tractor 
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing 
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply trav-
eled downhill as mentioned, and quite ob-
viously ran over the deceased. 
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur 
by assuming that coverage u p ^ r *^* nnlicy 
2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953. 
